报告题目：The Anti-Corruption Campaign and the Inter-Generational Transmission of Working in Bureaucracy: Evidence from China

主讲人：陈帅，英国莱斯特大学助理教授，卢森堡社会经济研究所（LISER）研究员。于2019年毕业于蒂尔堡大学，获得博士学位。研究领域包括劳动经济学，政治经济学，行为经济学和应用计量经济学。在Demograhy, Health Economics, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 等杂志发表多篇文章。

时 间：2023年7月5日（周三），12:00-13:30

地 点：厦门大学经济楼A117

摘 要：

There is a clear and persistent inequality of bureaucratic employment between individuals with bureaucrat parents and those without. Using the recent anti-corruption campaign in China as a quasi-experiment, we investigate how counter-corruption endeavors affect inequality in bureaucratic employment through inter-generational transmission. We conduct a difference-in-differences analysis to compare changes in the probability of working in bureaucracy after the campaign came into effect in different provincial administrative divisions of China, between individuals with a bureaucrat parent and those without. We find that before the campaign, bureaucrats' children were over 13 percentage points more likely to work in bureaucracy. However, after the campaign took effect, this premium significantly reduced by over 5 percentage points. Moreover, we explore potential mechanisms suggesting relatively better outside options of bureaucrats' children as a channel, while rejecting insider information of bureaucrat parents about the campaign or changes in perceptions of bureaucracy among bureaucrats' children as alternative explanations.